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THE ATTAINMENT OF PAY
EQUITY BETWEEN THE SEXES BY
LEGAL MEANS: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
George E. Johnson* and Gary R. Solon**
During the past few years there has been considerable discussion of proposals to increase the equity of the compensation system in the United States. Why, many people have asked, should
society tolerate a system in which different workers with virtually identical productive characteristics-education, training, experience, and the like-receive very different wage rates? In particular, is it right for women to be paid less than men who
appear to make roughly equal contributions to the output of the
economy? The disturbing fact is that the ratio of women's to
men's earnings has remained at approximately sixty percent
throughout the postwar period. 1 Although this figure is a misleading representation of the extent to which women are discriminated against in the labor market because it fails to adjust
for differences in hours worked and several other important factors discussed below, the fact remains that there has been little
discernible progress in the relative labor market status of women
despite the passage in the mid-1960's of far-reaching civil rights
legislation. 2 Whether the Equal Pay Act of 19633 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" have been poorly enforced or
were addressed to the wrong problems, these laws do not appear
to have had a substantial impact on the underlying problem.
This has led to new proposals, most notably comparable worth,
to "do something" about the inequity of the present compensation system.
* Professor of Economics, University of Michigan; affiliated with University of Michigan's Institute of Public Policy Studies; Ph.D., 1966, University of California at
Berkeley.
** Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Michigan; affiliated with University
of Michigan's Institute of Public Policy Studies; Ph.D., 1983, Princeton University.
1. For a thorough analysis of trends in the sex-earnings differential, see O'Neill, The
Trend in the Male-Female Wage Gap in the United States, J. LAB. EcoN., Jan. 1985, at
S91 (Supp.).
2. Id.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
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Some of the roughly forty percent average pay disparity between men and women can be explained by factors that most
people would agree are justifiable. Numerous studies using
microdata-observations on individuals rather than group averages-have attempted to decompose the average wage difference
between men and women into the part attributable to differences in productivity characteristics and the remainder that is
considered to be due to labor market discrimination of one sort
or another. 11 Although these studies are somewhat imperfect because of data limitations, they suggest that about half of the
forty percent gap can be explained by "nondiscriminatory" variables, principally the average difference between men and
women in the ratio of actual to potential labor market experience. None of the economywide studies finds that there is a zero
economywide earnings gap between the sexes even after adjustment for all available relevant variables.
The purpose of this Article is to present an analysis of the gap
between men's and women's wages with particular emphasis on
the likely effects of various existing and proposed legal remedies.
Part I sets out a simple "ideal" statistical model of wage determination. Its purpose is to identify carefully the potential impact of alternative legal remedies such as the Equal Pay Act,
Title VII, and proposed policies like comparable worth. This
model is ideal in the sense that, although it could be estimated
in principle, there is no data set currently available with which it
could actually be estimated. Part II explores the impact of these
various legal remedies on individual organizations, because each
existing or proposed remedy would be implemented on an organization-by-organization basis rather than on an economywide basis. Part III addresses the empirical dimensions of the problem
raised by the comparable worth movement-the average wage
disparity between "men's jobs" and "women's jobs." We initially
offer a range of estimates of the potential impact of comparable
worth on the average male-female wage gap in the United States
based on the assumption that there would be no secondary effects on employment, relative prices, and other wage levels. This
assumption is lifted in Part IV, which discusses the adjustments
that organizations affected by comparable worth or other laws
would make in their employment of different types of labor, the
5. See, e.g., Corcoran & Duncan, Work History, Labor Force Attachment, and Earnings Differences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 3 (1979); Oaxaca,
Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets, 14 INT'L ECON. REV. 693
(1973).

FALL

1986]

An Economic Analysis

185

associated wage rates, and their product prices. Consideration of
these secondary effects implies that legal interventions designed
to improve the relative labor market status of women might
have very different effects from those expected under the zeroadjustment assumption of Part III.
I.

A

COMPLETE MODEL OF WAGE DETERMINATION

The specification of a comprehensive model of the determinants of individual wage rates provides a useful starting point
for a systematic analysis of the potential impact of different antidiscrimination policies. We will specify a very general "earnings function" in which the wage rate per unit of time is considered a function of several sets of explanatory variables, that is
(1) W = W(PC,LOC,J,E,MON,R,S,L),
where the sets of variables represent the following:
PC: personal productivity characteristics, such as education, training, experience, and ability
LOC: locational description, such as region, city size,
and the like
J: particular job held by individual
E: employer
MON: monopoly factors, such as member of umon,
public employee, and the like
R: race of individual
S: sex of individual
L: luck, or any other random elements, not related to
the other explanatory variables, that influence W.
The earnings function may be written in linear form as
(2) W = aPC + bLOC + cJ + dE + eMON

+

tR

+

gS

+

L,

where the different sets of parameters (a, . . ., g) represent the
effects of the sets of explanatory variables on wages. It is convenient to define Was the natural logarithm of the wage rate, so
that changes in any one of the elements of the sets of explanatory variables affect the predicted wage of each individual pro-
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portionately rather than absolutely. For example, if S is specified as a dummy variable for males-that is, its value is one for
men and zero for women-the estimated value of g indicates the
proportionate wage advantage of men relative to women. If the
esti;mated value of g were .20, this would imply that, holding
other things (personal characteristics, ... , race) constant, men
on average earn exp(.20) - 1 = 22.1 % more than women.
The model embodied in equation (1) can be employed to analyze the potential impact of various antidiscrimination policies.
First, however, it should be pointed out that no one has ever
estimated a model as comprehensive as this because no real
world data set contains all the variables that can be considered
to influence wages. In the PC (personal productivity characteristics) set, for example, our hypothetical data set would have measures of motivation and individual ability that are almost never
available to researchers. In many data sets, in fact, years of actual labor market experience are proxied by years of potential
experience (age minus years of school completed minus six). Because women tend to have less actual experience per year of potential experience than do men, due to different life cycle patterns of labor force attachment, estimates of g (the
proportionate earnings advantage of men) based on these data
sets are biased in an upward direction. Our hypothetical data
set, however, is free of any problems associated with "omitted
variables."
The second interesting feature of the earnings function model
is that it can be used to decompose the average difference in the
wages of men and women into portions attributable to differences in the average values of each of the different sets of characteristics. Let D(W) be the difference between the average logarithm of the wage for men and that for women. Thus, if, for
example, women's hourly wages averaged two-thirds of men's,
D(W) would take the value of approximately log(l.5) = .405.
Similarly, let D(PC), D(LOC), etc. represent the differences between the average values for men and women of the various sets
of explanatory variables used in equation (2). It therefore follows that the difference in average log wages is given by
(3) D(W) = aD(PC)

+

bD(LOC)

+

cD(J)

+

dD(E)

+

eD(MON)

+

fD(R)

+ g. 6

6. The luck variable (the random error term) is assumed to be uncorrelated with sex
so that D(L) = 0.
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The value of aD(PC) reflects the effect of differences in personal
productivity characteristics on D(W), and past estimates, such
as those of Corcoran and Duncan, have attributed roughly half
of D(W) to differences in the average values of personal productivity characteristics that can be observed. 7
Another variable shown to have a significant impact on D(W)
is the MON variable. Specifically, the impact of union membership status on the logarithm of wages has been estimated to be
about .20 during the latter 1970's,8 when average union membership was about thirty percent for men and fifteen percent for
women. 9 Thus, the effect of unionism on the proportionate wage
advantage of men is estimated to be .20 * (.30 - .15) = .03, or
about eight percent of the average wage gap.
Two things that most empirical studies of wage determination
do not control for are the detailed job and employer of the individual. This is important in assessing the efficacy of existing civil
rights legislation and the potential of proposals such as comparable worth. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, for example, was
designed to prevent sex differences in wages within particular
jobs within particular firms. To assess whether or not there is
general compliance with the Equal Pay Act, one would have to
run a full version of the model embodied in equation (2); that is,
the regression equation would have to include a variable for each
employer represented by an individual in the sample. If the E
variables were not included, a large estimate of g might very well
reflect that the average male is employed by an organization
that pays higher wages than the organization employing the average female. This may be considered a bad thing, but it does
not reflect violation of the Equal Pay Act.
The second set of variables usually omitted in empirical studies of women's and men's wages are those referring to the detailed job performed by the individual (the J variables). To the
extent that job categories held predominantly by women, like
7. See Corcoran & Duncan, supra note 5. The literature stresses that one way discrimination against women occurs is that women are rewarded less for some characteristics than are men. To take account of this, a rather complicated procedure known as the
Oaxaca decomposition, developed in Oaxaca, supra note 5, is used to obtain a good estimate of g. We will assume that if the estimated coefficients for men and women in an
analysis of our hypothetical data. set were different from one another-and that, of
course, is an open, unanswerable question-the decomposition represented in equation
(3) would reflect the appropriate Oaxaca adjustment.
8. G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, PAY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WOMEN'S AND MEN'S JOBS:
THE EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH POLICY 26, Table I (Institute of
Public Policy Studies, University of Mich., Discussion Paper No. 254, 1986).
9. Id.
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secretaries, librarians, and nurses, systematically earn less, other
things (PC, LOC, etc.) held constant, than job categories held
primarily by men, like truckdrivers, engineers, and medical doctors, the omission of the J variables (a one-zero dummy variable
for every detailed occupation) will produce a higher estimated
coefficient on the dummy variable for men. As with the omission
of the E variables, this will provide an upward biased estimate
of the parameter g, which is supposed to represent the extent to
which men performing the same job within the same organization are overpaid relative to women, or women are underpaid
relative to men. Indeed, the fact that women's jobs tend to be
associated with lower compensation levels than men's jobs is the
motivation behind the push for comparable worth. 10 Parts III
and IV say more about the quantitative dimensions of this
problem.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to assure all qualified applicants equal access to jobs in all organizations covered by the legislation. This raises the thorny question
of how much of the differential "explained" by differences between men and women in job category and employer attachment, cD(J) + dD(E) in equation (3), represents voluntary
choices by women as opposed to exclusionary practices by employers. To the extent that the difference between the sexes in
the distributions of J and E represents exclusion rather than
choice, the coefficient on the male dummy variable in a regression like equation (2) with J and E excluded would reflect the
potential of full enforcement of Title VII, along with the Equal
Pay Act, for reducing the sex gap in wage rates. On the other
hand, women may on average have different preferences than
men for certain characteristics of jobs and employers; for example, a smaller fraction of women than of men might prefer highpaying jobs as coal miners to low-paying jobs as secretaries. To
the extent that such preference differences are responsible for
sex differences in occupation and employer, estimates of g with J
and E omitted tend to overstate the potential impact of Title
VII.

10.

COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION ANO ANALYSIS. NATIONAL RESEARCH

COUNCIL, WOMEN, WoRK, AND WAGES

at ix (1981) [hereinafter

NRC REPORT).
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THE IMPACT OF PAY EQUITY ON AN INDIVIDUAL
ORGANIZATION

It is instructive to illustrate the operation of the rather abstract model of wage determination set out in Part I by studying
the potential impact of various pay equity measures on a hypothetical organization. Because wage determination in the United
States is decentralized, any laws, including the existing ones,
must be enforced on an employer-by-employer basis. How a particular organization would be affected by a change in the legal
environment is thus of considerable importance.
The hypothetical firm is Schwine and Son Wholesale Furniture, Inc. (S&S) of Toledo, Ohio. The company purchases household furnishings in large quantities from manufacturers who
ship the merchandise to the Schwine warehouse; Schwine then
fills orders from furniture retailers who pick up the merchandise
at the warehouse. There are 237 employees at S&S, including
the President and founder, Rudolph Schwine, and the VicePresident for Operations, Larry Schwine, Rudolph's son. The
employment and annual salary distributions by each of the five
major job categories are shown in table 1.
Table 1
Employment and Salary Structure at Schwine
& Son Wholesale Furniture, Inc., August 1985
Salary ($000's)

Number of Employees
Job

Total

Men

Women

Entry

Max.

Average

Clerical
Warehouse
Sales
Supervisory
Management

100
100
15
20
2

5
95
14
15
2

95
5
1
5
0

12
15
20
20
40

16
19
50
36
70

14
17
33
28
55

The major function of the clerical job category is to make and
take orders by phone and to record all transactions on the company computer. Warehouse workers unload incoming items,
ranging from small appliances to couches and refrigerators, from
trucks and boxcars, move them to the appropriate area in the
warehouse, and then fill orders by loading them onto retailers'
trucks. Sales workers travel to retail stores in the Greater Toledo area to induce retailers to deal with S&S rather than other
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wholesalers. The supervisory job category involves supervising
the activities of the clerical and warehouse workers.
Ninety-five of the 106 women employees at S&S, or ninety
percent, are employed as clericals as compared to just four percent of men employees. There is no union representation at
S&S, and Rudolph Schwine states that he sets compensation
levels for the different job categories so as to balance employee
retention and motivation against the need to keep down labor
costs. "I pay what I have to," Schwine once said, "but no more."
The annualized labor cost, neglecting fringe benefits, is
$4,265,000.
The average annual salary of women at S&S is $14,800 as contrasted with men, exclusive of the Schwines, whose average annual salary is $20,100. This represents an average disparity of
$5,300 or a 35.8 % wage advantage for men, a 26.4 % wage disadvantage for women. We now ask what the potential is for alternative antidiscrimination laws to improve the status of women
at S&S.
First, application of the Equal Pay Act to S&S would not be
very promising. The slight disparity between the average salaries
of men and women employed as clericals is fully explained by
the fact that the five males in this category have, on average,
several more years of tenure with the company than do the
ninety-five females. For warehouse workers, the average salaries
of men and women are virtually identical. The sole woman on
the sales force took that position five months ago and receives
the same salary as three males with similar seniority. The average salary of the five women supervisors is less than that of the
fifteen men supervisors, but S&S justifies this on the grounds
that the competitive salary level for supervisors of clericals,
which includes all five of the women, is less than the competitive
salary of supervisors of material handlers, which includes ten of
the fifteen men. Supporting this defense is the fact that the five
male clerical supervisors earn roughly the same as their fem ale
counterparts.
Second, S&S could be attacked because it has not hired many
women in the higher paying jobs in the company, indicative of a
possible Title VII violation. Indeed, in 1977 two investigators
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission discussed
hiring practices with Schwine and announced that there was ample prima facie evidence indicating Title VII violations. Schwine
and his attorneys never heard anything about this again.
Schwine argued in 1977, and Larry would be prepared to so argue again in 1987, that the occupational structure at S&S re-
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fleets that women applicants generally express a strong preference for clerical as opposed to materials movement jobs in the
warehouse despite the difference in remuneration. Further, any
clerical worker can apply for a warehouse job or a promotion to
supervisor whenever there is a vacancy. "Hell," said Schwine,
"they don't want to move over to the warehouse, and our supervisors are promoted from the ranks on a competitive basis. I
would defend every damned decision we've made." The sex distribution of the sales force is more of a problem for S&S.
Schwine's attorneys advised him that his defense on this-"No
retailer in Maumee is ever going to buy twenty refrigerators
from a woman salesman!"-would not fly in court. In any event,
possibly because the target population is too small to involve a
large potential judgment or settlement, there is no legal action
pending against S&S at the present time.
Existing equal opportunity legislation will therefore be unlikely to have a significant effect on firms like S&S, even though
there is a large gap between the wages of men and women in
these companies. To do anything about the economywide wage
differential by sex, society has to do something about the individual Schwines. One possibility would be to pass a bill requiring that each firm adhere to a set of automatic affirmative action
guidelines (AAAG). The AAAG law would require that each employing unit must prove that it hires women in each of its job
categories at least in proportion to a certain specified set of quotas as determined by experts in the United States Office of Automatic Affirmative Action (OAAA). The simplest quota would
be the fraction of all workers who are women, currently about
.44, 11 across all occupations. A more interesting possibility for
setting quotas would be based on an attempt to estimate what
the sex distribution of jobs would be if there were no
discrimination.
Application of AAAG to Mr. Schwine's company would mean
that S&S would have to alter its work force to meet whatever
quotas are set by the OAAA for the four nonmanagerial job categories or be subject to whatever fine is established for noncompliance. Suppose that the quotas were set for the clerical, warehouse, sales, and supervisory job categories at, respectively, .60,
.35, .40, and .40. Presumably each organization in the economy
would be given a fairly long period of time to meet these quotas;
otherwise, each firm would have to fire large numbers of male
11.

1986
13, 290 Table B-32 (1986),

COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,

THE PRESIDENT

ANNUAL REPORT,

in

ECONOMIC REPORT OF
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employees with an attendant-perhaps lethal-disruption in
production. This means, essentially, that all vacancies in the
warehouse, sales, and supervisory job categories over the next
several years would have to be filled by women.
A program like AAAG is not going to take hold in the United
States political system. If only a relatively small number of business firms were subject to its provisions, these firms would be
driven out of business by firms that did not have to follow
AAAG. If its provisions covered a large portion of the labor market, there would be a political revolt on the part of the majority
of the adult population that would be hurt by its provisions. We
thus turn to an alternative policy, comparable worth, that, although not yet enshrined in law, has received a great deal of
legislative and judicial attention.
Under comparable worth, the sex-neutrality of wages and salaries within each organization would be subject to assessment by
"job evaluation" procedures. Under these procedures, each job
within an organization would be assigned points in each of several dimensions such as skill requirements, responsibility, effort,
and working conditions, and these scores would somehow be aggregated to an overall index of the job's worth. If it appeared
that the employer systematically paid lower wages in predominantly women's jobs than in predominantly men's jobs with similar total scores, the employer would be in violation of the law
and would be required to increase pay in women's jobs.
Now consider what the existence of a law establishing comparable worth would mean to our exemplary organization, S&S.
Assume that comparable worth were established as an amendment to the Equal Pay Act so that its strictures would be applied on a case-by-case basis rather than automatically as in our
hypothetical AAAG. The slogan underlying the amendment
would be "equal pay for jobs of comparable value" rather than
"equal pay for equal work."
The most obvious target of opportunity at S&S is the $3,000
average pay disparity between the clerical and warehouse job
categories. Suppose some attorneys take on the case for the
plaintiffs, the "class" of 100 clerical workers at S&S. The plaintiffs' attorneys hire the firm of Job Experts Limited (JEL) to
perform job evaluations of the two relevant job categories to obtain an objective, scientific measure of the relevant contribution
of each to the output of S&S. JEL proceeds to rank each of the
jobs with respect to four characteristics: (a) training requirements and intellectual demands, (b) responsibility and necessary
individual judgment, (c) physical exertion required, and (d) poor
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working environment. The scores, from 0 to 100, on each of
these four characteristics are then averaged, assigning equal
weights to each of the four characteristics, to provide an overall
score for each job. If the compensation level for each job category is related in a nondiscriminatory manner to its contribution
to the production of the firm, JEL argues and is prepared to so
testify in court, relative average compensation levels will be in
proportion to their scores in the job evaluation. As can be seen
in table 2, JEL's analysis of S&S concludes that the contributions of the two job categories are approximately equal and that,
therefore, clerical and warehouse workers at S&S ought to be
paid according to the same compensation scheme.
Table 2
Results of Job Evaluation of Clerical and Warehouse
Job Categories at Schwine and Son by Job Evaluation
Limited and Amendments by Defense Associates
DA

JEL Results
Results
Characteristics
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Training
Responsibility
Physical
Environment

Clerical Average
Warehouse Average
Warehouse/Clerical

Clerical

Warehouse

Weight

60
60
3
15

89

.25
.25
.25
.25

5

84
40
34.50
34.25
0.993

Weight
.36
.11
.33
.20
32.19
39.15
1.216

Schwine's attorneys, having deposed the JEL experts, hire
their own independent experts, a group from Defense Associates
(DA). The DA group, after a lengthy-and rather
costly-analysis, concludes that there is nothing wrong with the
scores assigned by JEL to each characteristic for the two job categories. They do, however, disagree strongly with JEL's assumption that each of the four characteristics are equally important
determinants of relative contribution. DA proposes, instead, an
alternative set of weights, shown on the right hand side of table
2, that they argue are justified in the job evaluation literature
and by several studies conducted by DA staff. Interestingly, the
DA experts point out, their results suggest that the average salary of warehouse workers relative to that of clerical workers
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should equal 1.216 as compared to its actual value of 17/14 =
1.214.
This case is likely to go to court, and its outcome will depend
on which set of experts the judge believes, as well as, of course,
on his or her predisposition on the comparable worth question.
There is no "scientific" way to resolve which set of experts is the
more correct because proponents of comparable worth have acknowledged that job evaluation procedures are "inherently judgmental."12 Their principal application with respect to comparable worth is to provide some justification for raising pay levels
for women's jobs relative to men's jobs.
Assume that S&S loses this case and is directed by the judge
to increase the salaries of its clerical workers by an average of
$3,000 so that their disparity with the warehouse workers is
eliminated. What would Schwine do? Would women workers, at
S&S and in the Greater Toledo area generally, be better or
worse off? Part IV returns to these and related questions.
III.

EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
COMPARABLE WORTH

This Part provides some evidence about the potential impact
of a hypothetical law that attempts to increase the equity of the
United States compensation system by removing the differential
in pay between men's and women's jobs. In terms of Part II, we
assume that the comparable worth law applies to all employers
in the economy and that the plaintiffs always win and the
Schwines always lose. Further, we assume that employers make
no adjustments after comparable worth is put into effect-specifically, that the higher wages they have to pay work-.
ers in women's jobs have no impact on wages in men's jobs or on
relative employment levels and prices. Both of these assumptions are unrealistic; unless comparable worth were set up to
work automatically, there would be ample room for judgment on
the part of the legal system-the Schwines would sometimes
win-and, as Part IV will point out, there would be very significant wage and employment effects.
Under these assumptions, the potential impact of comparable
worth on the average gap between the wages of men and women
can be approximated by the negative of the differential effect of
femaleness of job on the male wage advantage. Suppose that in12.

NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 96.
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stead of including a dummy variable for each occupation (the J
variables) in equation (2) we include a single variable F, which
stands for the fraction of all workers in that occupation who are
women. The value of F varies from less than one percent, for
firefighters, plumbers, and the like, to ninety-nine percent, for
secretaries, housekeepers, and the like. To the extent that the
wages of women's jobs are, other things equal, less than those for
men's jobs, we would expect that the coefficient of F in an empirical earnings function would be negative. This should be true
for both men and women. 13
The linear version of this modified wage function is given by
(4) W = mF

+

aPC

+

bLOC

+

dE

+

eMON

+

tR

+

gS

+

L,

where, given that W is entered in logarithmic form, m represents
the proportionate difference between wages in a completely female job (F=l) and a completely male job (F=O). The actual
implementation of an equation like (4), of course, must be on
the less than perfect data sets that are available to researchers.
The resultant estimates of the relevant parameters, in particular
m and g, are biased, but, alas, they are the only available
estimates.
A variety of estimates of the m parameter based on microdata
from the May 1978 Current Population Survey are presented in
table 3. 14

13. The five male clerical workers at S&S earn less than the 95 male warehouse workers. The female warehouse workers earn more than clerical workers.
14. The Current Population Survey is a monthly household survey conducted by the
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Our data from the May 1978 survey contain observations on
24,056 men and 19,412 women. For more detail on the data base and estimates, see
G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, supra note 8.
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Table 3
Estimates for Men and Women of the Proportionate
Effect of Femaleness of Occupation on Wages With
Alternative Adjustments for Other Factors
Adjustments
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(0

none
full
limited
limited (less schooling and experience)
full (with 48 industry variables)
limited (with 48 industry variables)

Men

Women

-.343
-.168
-.176
-.233
-.160
-.157

-.244
-.090
-.085
-.093
-.068
-.057

Variables in full model (underscored variables are included in limited model):
PC: schooling, experience (and its square), part time, marital status,
children
Occupational Characteristics: educational development, vocational preparation, required strength, physical demands, job environment, fraction
part time
LOC: region, city size
R: black, other race
E: 20 industry variables (or 48 industry variables)

MON: union membership and representation, public employee

The equations on which these estimates are based were estimated separately for men and women because several of the coefficients clearly differed by sex. Three sets of facts are contained in these parameter estimates. First, it is true for both
men and women that wages are lower in women's than in men's
jobs. 15 For example, for the case in which no adjustments are
included-that is, W is related only to F-the estimated value of
m is -.343 for men. This implies that for men the estimated ratio
of the wage in a completely male job to an almost completely
female job is exp(.343) = 1.409, or, for men, women's jobs pay
29.0% less than men's jobs. For women, the men's job/women's
job wage ratio is 1.276, or women's jobs pay 21.7% less than
men's jobs.
The second fact is that the magnitude of the effect of F on W
is greater for men than for women. This is true for all variations
of the model with different included control variables, and, indeed, the magnitude of the effect for men relative to women becomes greater when the number of included control variables is
increased.
15. The estimated standard errors of the various estimates of m range from .013 to
.016, so the effect is highly significant in a statistical sense.
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The third fact is that the negative relation between W and F
falls as more control variables are added to the regression equation. Moving from no control variables, (a), to a full set of controls, (b), the estimated ratio of the wages of men's to women's
jobs falls from 1.409 to 1.183 for men and from 1.276 to 1.094 for
women. Notice that instead of a full set of variables on the individual's employer, this data set (like all other similar data sets)
only permits the inclusion of industry control variables. 18 These
industry variables, it turns out, are responsible for the majority
of the reduction in the absolute values in the estimated m's for
men and women. Moreover, moving from the inclusion of twenty
industry dummy variables to the inclusion of forty-eight industry variables (from (b) to (e) and from (c) to (f)) reduces the
estimated impact of F on W still further. We suggest that the
absolute magnitudes of the estimates of m would be reduced still
further if we could include a proper adjustment for each individual's employer rather than simply the industry in which the individual is employed.
If the estimated coefficients on F had been roughly the same
for men and women, the task of estimating the initial impact of
comparable worth on D(W), the proportionate wage advantage
of men over women, would be rather straightforward. The mean
value of F is .21 for men and .71 for women, so the difference
between men and women in the mean value of this variable is
D(F) = -.50. If the m for both sexes were, say, -.15, the contribution of the differential effect of femaleness of job to the malefemale wage gap would be (-.15) * (-.50) = .075. This would
mean that a comparable worth law that was applied throughout
the economy and had no secondary effects would eliminate .075
of the gross male wage advantage, which was equal to .411 in the
1978 Current Population Survey sample, or eighteen percent of
the gap.
It turns out, of course, that we cannot assume that m is the
same for men and women; its absolute value is significantly
greater for men than for women in all specifications of the model
reported in table 3. To know how comparable worth would affect
the wage structure and the economy, it is necessary to understand why we get the consistent result that femaleness of job
lowers the wages of men more than it lowers the wages of
women. The most plausible explanation we can think of is that
high-paying firms pay premiums in certain, primarily male job
16. The industry variables are 20 dummy variables indicating in which industry the
individual works: mining, construction, durable goods manufacturing, etc.
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categories to attract workers with low turnover rates. Because
women have higher average turnover rates than men, 17 these
firms are less likely than lower paying, high-turnover firms to
hire women in these positions. On average, then, women in an
occupation with a large proportion of males earn less relative to
males in the same occupation than do women in an occupation
with a large proportion of females. The argument does not apply
in reverse to males in occupations with a large proportion of females, for employers gear their work and supervisory patterns in
these jobs to the expected work pattern of women. This argument, which is not "proven" but, rather, merely consistent with
the second fact mentioned above, does imply a greater penalty
to the average man taking a job held primarily by women than
to the average woman doing the same thing.
If this explanation, or a related variant of it, is the reason for
the sex difference in the estimated. values of m, it is straightforward to show that the initial impact of comparable worth on the
male-fem ale wage differential is bracketed by the estimates obtained by using the coefficients of W on F for men and for
women. For the full model, the (b) estimates in table 3, the effect of comparable worth is seen to be between .090 * .5 = .045
and .168 * .5 = .084. 18
The remaining question concerns which adjustments in earnings in table 3 are appropriate. This is equivalent to the question of which variables employers would be allowed to use for
determining pay under comparable worth. If they would have to
base pay primarily or solely on job characteristics, rather than
worker characteristics, then the results from the limited specifications are more relevant. On the other hand, if "worker characteristics regarded as legitimate compensable factors" also were
allowed, as recommended in a National Research Council report, 19 the full specifications might be more relevant. In any
case, it is clear that whatever form comparable worth eventually
takes it will be administered on an employer-by-employer basis
rather than on an economywide, industrywide, or areawide basis.
Thus, inferences about the likely initial effects are best based on
a model that includes as much detail as possible on the industry
in which the individual is employed. Once our most detailed in17. See, e.g., Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM.
REV. 716, 723 (1982).
18. Demonstration of the result that the "true" effect of comparable worth is bracketed by the estimates from the male and female coefficients is (somewhat tediously)
given in G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, supra note 8.
19. NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 86.
ECON.
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dustry variables are included, there is not very much difference
between the full and limited specifications in the estimated m's.
In either case, the estimated impact of comparable worth on the
male-female wage differential is between about .03 and .08.
These estimates are based on the explicit assumption that
comparable worth would effectively cover the entire economy.
This would not be true, though, if very small firms were excluded from coverage as they are presently under the Equal Pay
Act 20 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 21 Further, moderately small firms, although formally subject to comparable
worth, might be effectively uncovered because the affected classes might be too small to motivate plaintiffs and/or attorneys to
undertake litigation. Finally, if the comparable worth law were
worded as ambiguously as its precursors, some noncomplying
firms would win their cases, which would further reduce the
law's impact.
IV.

LONG RUN IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH AND
OTHER PAY EQUITY LEGISLATION

The results in Part III are based on the explicit assumption
that comparable worth would have no impact on relative product prices, the wages of other types of labor, that is, for men's
jobs, or relative employment demand in organizations affected
by the law. This is, in fact, an unrealistic assumption, and this
Part investigates the impact of comparable worth and other fair
employment laws in a longer run context.
First, consider the impact on S&S of a victory by the plaintiffs
in the hypothetical comparable worth suit discussed in Part II.
S&S's total wage costs of $4.3 million are increased by
$300,000-$3000 per clerical worker times 100 employees in that
category-or by seven percent. Obviously, Schwine will be
forced to make some adjustments in the production process of
the company. Larry Schwine has been trying for some time to
get his father to agree to an order system that makes use of a
centralized computer. Schwine Senior has rejected this on the
grounds that "my girls can do better than that (expletive deleted) computer any day." Upon the loss of the comparable
worth case, Larry immediately shows Papa that the company
can reduce its clerical work force to just fifty of the original one
20. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)-(2) (1982).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
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hundred as long as they hire five computer operators, and that
this move would, in the long run, save S&S $175,000 per year.
Another possibility is that S&S will no longer be able to compete in the wholesale furniture business and will have to close.
This will depend upon whether the competition also has been
forced to abide by the new comparable worth law. If the other
firms in the industry are not forced to raise their clerical wages,
they will have a price advantage over S&S whether or not the
Schwines decide to "automate." 22
In either event, at least some, and possibly all, of the incumbent clerical workers at S&S are going to lose their jobs and will
be forced to seek employment elsewhere. Many other organizations in the Toledo area-the Jeep plant, the Lucas County government, and several other large employers-have also been
forced to raise the wages of their clerical workers and have made
the appropriate employment adjustments, so there are a lot of
people looking for clerical jobs in the area and, because comparable worth is a national program, throughout the country.
Many firms and industries, of course, are not covered by the law,
and they find that, because of the new availability of clerical
workers displaced from covered employment, they are able to
hire all the clerical workers they want at lower wages than they
used to pay. Further, many new firms that offer to sell businesses clerical services have sprung up. These firms are careful
not to have any men's jobs so that there is no obvious comparison group necessary for a successful comparable worth suit.
They are able to offer clerical services to large firms affected by
comparable worth at a price much lower than what it would cost
the firms to produce these services with their own (overpriced)
labor.
It is straightforward to set out an economic model that investigates the effect of comparable worth on the average wage rates
for women's jobs, both absolutely and relative to the wages of
men's jobs. There are several directions that one can take in this
sort of endeavor, but the basic elements of the problem are contained in the following very simple model. Suppose that there
are three jobs in the economy. Jobs 1 and 2 are both women's
jobs, in the sense that most of them are held by women, and job
3 is the men's job. Prior to the imposition of comparable worth,
the wage rates of both jobs 1 and 2 are equal to sixty-five percent of the wage for job 3, the men's job, which is, arbitrarily,
22. If Larry's original proposal had been profitable before the unfavorable court decision, S&S-and the competition-would have put it in place already.
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equal to one hundred. We will also assume that the total level of
employment in the women's jobs is forty-five and that the employment level in job 3 is fifty-five. This corresponds to the relative proportions of men and women in the labor force. The level
of real GNP due to labor services-that is, net of capital and
other factors of production-is thus equal to 65 * 45 + 100 * 55
= 8425.
Now consider the imposition of a comparable worth law that
covers job 1 but not job 2. Assume that the initial level of employment in both jobs 1 and 2 is 22.5, so that the law effectively
covers fifty percent of employment in women's jobs. We will assume that comparable worth increases the wage of job 1 to .75 of
the wage of job 3 from the initial ratio of .65. 23 What would happen to the wages and employment levels in the three jobs and to
the level of GNP as a result of the imposition of comparable
worth? First, assume that the level of GNP is determined by an
aggregate production function with the employment levels of the
three different jobs described above. This production function
has a constant elasticity of substitution between the three labor
inputs, which will be referred to as s. The larger the value of s
the more readily employment of one type of labor can be substituted for each of the other types. The demand for each of the
three types of labor depends negatively on its real wage level
and also depends on the wage levels of the other two kinds of
labor. The absolute own wage elasticity of labor demand is
greater the higher the assumed value of s.
The second key assumption of the model is that the total supplies of labor to both women's jobs (jobs 1 and 2) and the men's
job (job 3) are fixed. This means that any changes in the wage
rates of the three jobs caused by the imposition of comparable
worth is assumed to have no impact on either the aggregate labor force or the fraction of the labor force that chooses to work
in the two women's jobs versus the men's job. There are several
ways in which this assumption could be altered, 2 " but simulation
results based on the simplest assumption are of considerable
interest.
These simulation results are shown in tables 4 and 5:
23. This corresponds to a value of m of -.143.
24. For example, the fraction of the labor force seeking women's jobs could be assumed to depend positively on the ratio of the average wage of the two women's jobs to
the wage of the men's job.
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Table 4
Impact of CW (as Described in Text) on GNP,
Employment Levels, Wage Rates, and Average
Wage Level for Women's Jobs
GNP

Nl

N2

Wl

W2

W3

AV

8425

22.5

22.5

65.0

65.0

100.0

65.0

(b) Free
8650
Lunch +2.7%

22.5

22.5

75.0
+15.4%

65.0

100.0

70.0
+7.7%

(a) Initial

(c) s=.5

8411
-0.2%

20.9
-7.1%

24.1

74.8
+15.0%

56.7
-12.8%

99.7
-0.3%

65.1
+0.1%

(d) s=l

8398
-0.3%

19.5
-13.3%

25.5

74.8
+15.0%

57.2
-12.0%

99.7
-0.3%

64.8
-0.3%

(e) s=2

8379
-0.6%

16.9
-24.9%

28.1

74.8
+15.1 %

58.0
-10.8%

99.7
-0.3%

64.3
-1.1%

(0 s=5

8344
-1.0%

11.0
-51.2%

34.0

74.9
+15.2%

59.7
-8.1%

99.8
-0.2%

63.4
-2.4%

Table 5
Changes in GNP and Its Distribution in Response
to CW for Alternative Elasticities of Substitution
Change in Income of:
Substitution
Assumption
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(0

None
s=.5
s=l
s=2
s=5

GNP

Job 1

Job 2

Job 3

.0267
-.0017
-.0031
-.0055
-.0097

.0267
.0242
.0226
.0196
.0129

0
-.0237
-.0237
-.0233
-.0213

0
-.0022
-.0020
-.0018
-.0013

The initial values of GNP, the employment levels in the two
women's jobs (Nl and N2), the three wage rates (Wl, W2, and
W3), and the average wage of the two women's jobs (AV, which
is weighted by the employment levels of the two jobs) are given
in row (a) of table 4. Row (b) shows what happens to these variables on the assumption that comparable worth is a free lunch,
i.e., the law has no impact on employment levels and other
wages. Wl, the wage of the covered women's job, increases by
15.4% to 75, and the average wage of women's jobs increases by
7. 7 % to 70. The increase in the real wage bill for holders of job 1
is equal to .0267 of the pre-comparable worth level of GNP. Because payments to the three types of labor must equal GNP at-
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tributable to labor services, the free lunch assumption implies
that GNP must rise by 2.7%. However, because employment
levels in the three jobs are assumed to be constant in the free
lunch calculation, this scenario obviously cannot happen. Only
Democrats before 1980 and Republicans after 1980 can make
something from nothing.
Rows (c) through (f) of tables 4 and 5 show the effects of comparable worth for different assumed elasticities of substitution
when employers are free to make appropriate adjustments. For
the low value of s (row (c)), 7.1 % of the initial holders of job 1
are forced to transfer to job 2. Those initial holders of job 1 who
are sufficiently lucky to retain their jobs experience a 15.0%
wage increase, but other holders of women's jobs, those initially
in job 2 and those who lost job 1, incur a 12.8% wage reduction.
With s = .5, the average wage of all holders of women's jobs
rises slightly, and the wage of the men's job falls by a little more
than AV rises. For higher values of s, however, AV falls both
absolutely and relative to W3.
The reduction in GNP associated with comparable worth is
fairly small as compared with its redistributive impact. For s =
1, for example, GNP falls by 0.3%-about $12 billion in 1985
terms. The real incomes of holders of men's jobs and of all holders of women's jobs also fall by 0.3 %. The important effect of
comparable worth is a redistribution of income from workers in
the women's job 2 to those who are lucky enough to obtain a
covered women's job. The size of this transfer is much larger (by
a factor of about eight) than the aggregate efficiency loss. This
general result-that the major effect of comparable worth is to
transfer income between women rather than from men to
women workers-is quite insensitive to the assumed elasticity of
intrafactor substitution in the economy. 2 ~
It could be argued that the "real world" effect of comparable
worth on the absolute and relative earnings of women would be
more favorable than is implied by the results of our simple
model. First, many noneconomists might dispute our assumption
that all or even a majority of organizations would react to the
higher relative wages for their women's jobs by substituting machinery and other types of labor for women's jobs. This is, of
course, an empirical question, and we would argue that there is a
25. The available empirical evidence on the size of the substitution elasticity in the
United States suggests that it is larger than one but finite, probably between 1.5 and 2.
For a survey of this topic, see Hamermesh & Grant, Econometric Studies of Labor-Labor
Substitution and Their Implications for Policy, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 518 (1979).
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great deal of evidence against the notion that organizations-including governments and nonprofit institutions-are
insensitive to relative prices when they make employment decisions. Further, the availability of the "out-sourcing" option
would tend to make many women's jobs more price sensitive
than other types of labor in organizations.
A second criticism might center on our assumption that the
supply of labor to women's jobs would not be affected by the
law. It is, in fact, not clear what would be the effect of altering
this assumption. On the one hand, women who do not receive
"good" women's jobs-that is, jobs in organizations effectively
covered by comparable worth-might choose to take men's jobs
or drop out of the labor force rather than accept a "bad"
women's job-that is, a job in an organization not covered by
comparable worth. This would reduce the negative impact of
comparable worth on wages in uncovered women's jobs and
would also, to a limited extent, reduce the average wage in men's
jobs. On the other hand, the best outcome for someone who
wanted a women's job prior to the imposition of comparable
worth is to receive a high-paying women's job. If there is sufficiently high turnover in these jobs, many people will queue for
them and take temporary low-paying women's jobs in the
meantime. Indeed, if comparable worth did increase the average
wage of women's relative to men's jobs, a larger fraction of both
women and men would probably decide to train for women's
jobs. If, as is more likely, comparable worth had a negative impact on the relative attractiveness of women's jobs, the resultant
training decisions would lessen the negative relative wage impact
of comparable worth.
It should be pointed out that other antidiscrimination policies,
such as a more vigorous enforcement of Title VII or the hypothetical AAAG program discussed in Part II, may be subject to
similar dismal conclusions concerning their long-run impact.
Consider, for example, an economy in which there are two types
of jobs, job A, which requires very little employer-specific training, and job B, which requires a great deal of such training. Abstracting from other aspects of jobs-their educational requirements, nonpecuniary attributes, etc.-employers will obviously
attempt to hire people for job B who can be expected to remain
on the job for a long time. If, on the contrary, an organization
trained applicants who were likely to quit after a relatively short
stay with the firm, its costs would be higher than if it were careful to train only applicants who could be expected to exhibit a
low rate of labor turnover. Now assume that the expected num-
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her of years that any job applicant will stay with the firm is related to some function of observable characteristics that we shall
call the applicant's "score." This would be related to his or her
education and training, previous job history, and the like. Assume also that, given identical scores, women have shorter expected job attachment duration than men, or at least that employers believe this to be so. Given this assumption, a costminimizing organization will obviously require a higher minimum score for the women it hires to train for job B than for
men. 26 If it did not practice this form of "statistical discrimination" (and, for example, set the same hiring requirements for
both sexes) and if women indeed have shorter average job duration than men with the same score, a nondiscriminating organization would incur higher costs than its discriminating competitors. In a competitive situation, it would be driven out of
business; if the organization were a government agency, it would
be labeled as inefficient and its function recommended by the
Grace Commission for contracting out to the private sector.
Given the practice of statistical discrimination in this simple
but very relevant model, if employers are correct in expecting
shorter job duration for women, then the economy does operate
at maximum efficiency. It is, however, not a "fair" outcome in
the sense that women whose scores are equal to or a little above
the cutoff for men are relegated to the lower paying job A rather
than the higher paying job B. Further, because women receive a
lower return on characteristics that raise their scores into the
marginal range, they will have less incentive than men to acquire
these characteristics. This tends to exacerbate sex differences in
occupation which, of course, provide the underlying motivation
for the comparable worth movement.
Now consider the vigorous enforcement of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act in the context of this model. It would now be
illegal for any organization to set different hiring standards for
men and women. This means that the cutoff score to be hired
into job B would be lowered for women and raised for men with
the obvious result that more women and fewer men would enter
the higher paying occupation. This would mean, because of the
assumption that women have higher ceteris paribus turnover
rates, that the aggregate level of GNP would fall to some extent
due to the inefficiency caused by the increased training costs
made necessary by the increased hiring of women for job B.
26.
INDUS.

See Aigner & Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30
& LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1977).
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The gainers from this policy would be the women who would
be hired as B's under the new rules but would have been A's
without it. Women with low scores (who would be A's both
before and after the new policy) and with very high scores (B's
in both regimes) and their male counterparts would incur a
slight loss in income. 27 The big losers would be the men with
marginal characteristics who would no longer be eligible to be
B's because of the increase in the cutoff score for men. The major difference between the Title VII and comparable worth options is that the big income transfer in the former is from men
to women rather than between women in the latter.
CONCLUSION

We have examined several options for increasing the equity of
the compensation system in the United States with particular
emphasis on comparable worth. Our main concern is with the
question of what economic effects a policy would have. Our main
points are as follows:
1. Between three and eight percentage points of the thirtyfive percent gap between the average wages of men and women
is attributable to sex differences in occupation. 28 This range represents the maximum potential initial impact of a comparable
worth law with universal coverage and compliance and no secondary effects. A comparable worth law of this form would also
eliminate violations of the Equal Pay Act, but the available evidence is that these are not quantitatively important. 29 In proportionate terms, then, our estimates of the maximum potential
initial impact of comparable worth range from eight to twentythree percent of the current wage gap, which is not, in our view,
trivial.
2. The actual implementation of a comparable worth law, assuming it contained enforcement mechanisms similar to those
for the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
would not be comprehensive. This means that the wages of
women's jobs in some organizations would be increased, but this
would reduce employment in women's jobs in such organizations
and would lower wages for women's jobs in organizations not effectively covered by the law. The effect of comparable worth on
27. Their loss is similar to the fall in GNP in the comparable worth example.
28. See supra Part III.
29. G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, supra note 8, at 3-4.
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the average compensation of women, both relatively and in real
terms, is ambiguous, but the preponderance of evidence suggests
that substitution elasticities between labor types are sufficiently
large that the impact of comparable worth on the labor market
status of women would likely be negative. By comparison, a vigorous enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act would
raise the average labor market status of women, although some
women would be hurt by the policy.

